My research focuses on several themes that lie at the intersection of peace studies and comparative politics: comparative democratization, elections, civil conflict, and international development. My research has often relied on cross-national statistical work, but has also involved fieldwork in Colombia, focus groups and workshops, and experimental and survey work. In practice, these interests have translated into several major projects, which I describe below. .
Imagining Democracy (with Audrey Williams)
A central truth permeates our daily political discourse in the United States: democracy is in crisis. And most of contemporary political science characterizes US voters’ democratic spirit as moribund in the extreme. But we believe this pessimism is unwarranted.To help citizens re-engage with their democratic imaginations, we follow the examples of peace scholar Elise Boulding, who created “imaging workshops” encouraging citizens to envision a more peaceful future and take action to bring it about, and of activist-writer adrienne maree brown , who roots her speculative justice workshops in practices that assist people in imagining the future. We are holding a series of Imagining Democracy Workshops that ask citizens to imagine a more democratic future, a speculative history of how that future came about, and how they participated in that history.
To date, we have written two conference papers and are in the midst of applying for funding and doing data collection for project.
To date, we have written two conference papers and are in the midst of applying for funding and doing data collection for project.
The Political Economy of Elections and Democratization
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the Western-led international community has encouraged developing countries to hold elections as a visible manifestation of their democratic commitments. The result has been an electoral surge in every corner of the globe. Yet the success of the electoral project is open to question, as elections have at times incited social instability and failed to promote democracy. My research in this area has focused on how the practice of democracy, particularly through elections, can at times founder in difficult the political-economic environments, such as constrained fiscal space and civil war.
Book: Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century (2016, Cambridge University Press, with Irfan Nooruddin)
Why are “free and fair” elections so often followed by democratic backsliding? Elections in Hard Times answers this critical question, showing why even clean elections fail to advance democracy when held amidst challenging structural conditions. The book opens with a comprehensive, accessible synthesis of fifty years of research on elections and democratization, a boon for experts, policymakers, and students. It then develops a new theory of why elections fail in countries with little democratic history or fiscal resources, and a history of violent conflict. In a series of five empirical chapters, the book leverages an eclectic mix of cross-national data, short case studies, and surveys of voters to support this theory. Elections in Hard Times closes with a careful examination of popular strategies of democracy promotion, evaluating steps designed to support elections. This book will attract academic experts on democratization and elections, students, and policymakers.
Articles
I have also published several articles on the political economy of democratization, elections, aid, and post-conflict recovery. See my CV for a complete list.
2023. “Why incumbents perpetrate election violence during civil war” (With Irfan Nooruddin). Conflict Management and Peace Science. 40(5): 533-553.
Abstract: Civil conflict increases incumbents’ vulnerability, expands their coercive capacity, enervates public good provision, and stifles public opposition. Consequently, we expect that elections held during civil conflict will feature more incumbent-perpetrated election violence. We test our argument with disaggregated data on election violence, generating two principal findings. First, elections held during civil conflict are more likely to feature violent coercion by incumbents. Second, this effect does not depend on the conflict's intensity or political salience, but is endemic to conflict-affected societies as a class. This raises questions about the nature of elections in conflict-affected societies and the relationship between forms of political violence.
2018. “Colombia: Democracy, Violence, and the Peacebuilding Challenge” (with Juan F. Vargas).
2018. “Colombia: Democracy, Violence, and the Peacebuilding Challenge” (with Juan F. Vargas). Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(6): 581-586.
Note: This was an introduction to a special issue on peacebuilding in Colombia (co-edited with Juan F. Vargas)
Abstract: After years of painstaking negotiations and political obstacles, the end to the conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government appears irreversible. Daunting challenges to the implementation of the agreement remain, however. The five pieces in this special issue rigorously examine those challenges. In doing so, they explore how the field of peace science can help us understand Colombia’s transition from war to peace and how Colombia raises new unexplored questions for scholars. This introduction describes the principal findings of the special issue before offering tangible advice to peacebuilders working in Colombia.
2012. "The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Politics 74(2): 558-570.
Abstract: Elections are the centerpiece of efforts to rehabilitate countries devastated by civil conflict, and they are held increasingly often and early. We argue that the inability of postconflict politicians to commit credibly to respect peace and democracy implies that elections will inflame tensions unless countries have previous democratic experience or elections are delayed to allow for institution building. We test this theoretical framework with a
statistical model of economic recovery and conflict recurrence. We show that early elections, particularly in new democracies, hasten recurrence; delaying elections two years in new democracies or one year in more established democracies can help forestall renewed violence.
2009. "Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Review of International Organizations 4(1): 1--27 (lead article).
Abstract: Does World Bank aid to countries damaged by civil conflict meet its stated goals of speeding economic recovery and reducing the risk of conflict recidivism? We contend that the Bank’s success depends on its ability to bolster and signal the credibility of politicians’ commitments to peaceful politics and tailor its programs to the post-conflict environment. In the first systematic evaluation of World Bank post-conflict assistance, we estimate selection-corrected event history models of the effect of Bank programs on recovery and recurrence using an original dataset of all World Bank programs in post-conflict environments. Among key results, we find that the Bank tends to select aid recipients according to their pre-existing probability of conflict recurrence and that, once we control for this non-random selection, the Bank has no systematic effect on either conflict recurrence or economic recovery.
2009. "Democracy Under the Gun: Understanding Post-Conflict Economic Recovery" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(3): 3--29 (lead article).
Abstract: Increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics. But why do some countries' economies recover more quickly than others'? The authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery. In turn, the ability of political actors to eschew further violence credibly depends on postconflict political institutions. The authors test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results. First, they find that postconflict democratization retards recovery. Second, outright military victory sets the stage for a longer peace than negotiated settlements do. This research deepens the understanding of the bases of economic recovery and conflict recidivism in postconflict countries and points to future research that can augment this knowledge further still.
Book: Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century (2016, Cambridge University Press, with Irfan Nooruddin)
Why are “free and fair” elections so often followed by democratic backsliding? Elections in Hard Times answers this critical question, showing why even clean elections fail to advance democracy when held amidst challenging structural conditions. The book opens with a comprehensive, accessible synthesis of fifty years of research on elections and democratization, a boon for experts, policymakers, and students. It then develops a new theory of why elections fail in countries with little democratic history or fiscal resources, and a history of violent conflict. In a series of five empirical chapters, the book leverages an eclectic mix of cross-national data, short case studies, and surveys of voters to support this theory. Elections in Hard Times closes with a careful examination of popular strategies of democracy promotion, evaluating steps designed to support elections. This book will attract academic experts on democratization and elections, students, and policymakers.
Articles
I have also published several articles on the political economy of democratization, elections, aid, and post-conflict recovery. See my CV for a complete list.
2023. “Why incumbents perpetrate election violence during civil war” (With Irfan Nooruddin). Conflict Management and Peace Science. 40(5): 533-553.
Abstract: Civil conflict increases incumbents’ vulnerability, expands their coercive capacity, enervates public good provision, and stifles public opposition. Consequently, we expect that elections held during civil conflict will feature more incumbent-perpetrated election violence. We test our argument with disaggregated data on election violence, generating two principal findings. First, elections held during civil conflict are more likely to feature violent coercion by incumbents. Second, this effect does not depend on the conflict's intensity or political salience, but is endemic to conflict-affected societies as a class. This raises questions about the nature of elections in conflict-affected societies and the relationship between forms of political violence.
2018. “Colombia: Democracy, Violence, and the Peacebuilding Challenge” (with Juan F. Vargas).
2018. “Colombia: Democracy, Violence, and the Peacebuilding Challenge” (with Juan F. Vargas). Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(6): 581-586.
Note: This was an introduction to a special issue on peacebuilding in Colombia (co-edited with Juan F. Vargas)
Abstract: After years of painstaking negotiations and political obstacles, the end to the conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government appears irreversible. Daunting challenges to the implementation of the agreement remain, however. The five pieces in this special issue rigorously examine those challenges. In doing so, they explore how the field of peace science can help us understand Colombia’s transition from war to peace and how Colombia raises new unexplored questions for scholars. This introduction describes the principal findings of the special issue before offering tangible advice to peacebuilders working in Colombia.
2012. "The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Politics 74(2): 558-570.
Abstract: Elections are the centerpiece of efforts to rehabilitate countries devastated by civil conflict, and they are held increasingly often and early. We argue that the inability of postconflict politicians to commit credibly to respect peace and democracy implies that elections will inflame tensions unless countries have previous democratic experience or elections are delayed to allow for institution building. We test this theoretical framework with a
statistical model of economic recovery and conflict recurrence. We show that early elections, particularly in new democracies, hasten recurrence; delaying elections two years in new democracies or one year in more established democracies can help forestall renewed violence.
2009. "Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Review of International Organizations 4(1): 1--27 (lead article).
Abstract: Does World Bank aid to countries damaged by civil conflict meet its stated goals of speeding economic recovery and reducing the risk of conflict recidivism? We contend that the Bank’s success depends on its ability to bolster and signal the credibility of politicians’ commitments to peaceful politics and tailor its programs to the post-conflict environment. In the first systematic evaluation of World Bank post-conflict assistance, we estimate selection-corrected event history models of the effect of Bank programs on recovery and recurrence using an original dataset of all World Bank programs in post-conflict environments. Among key results, we find that the Bank tends to select aid recipients according to their pre-existing probability of conflict recurrence and that, once we control for this non-random selection, the Bank has no systematic effect on either conflict recurrence or economic recovery.
2009. "Democracy Under the Gun: Understanding Post-Conflict Economic Recovery" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(3): 3--29 (lead article).
Abstract: Increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics. But why do some countries' economies recover more quickly than others'? The authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery. In turn, the ability of political actors to eschew further violence credibly depends on postconflict political institutions. The authors test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results. First, they find that postconflict democratization retards recovery. Second, outright military victory sets the stage for a longer peace than negotiated settlements do. This research deepens the understanding of the bases of economic recovery and conflict recidivism in postconflict countries and points to future research that can augment this knowledge further still.
The Political Economy of Technocratic Expertise
Most work in political economy, mine included, is institutionalist in its framework. In other words, we political economists tend to concern ourselves with understanding how different institutions create different incentives for politicians, workers, and capitalists, creating different economic outcomes. In this project, co-investigated with Irfan Nooruddin and Gabriella Lloyd we make a very different claim -- namely, that the educational background of world leaders matters for how they govern. In particular, we're interested in how technocrats -- those with expertise in finance and economics, particularly from prestigious Western universities -- govern differently. This has involved the creation of a new dataset on the professional background of every had of government between 1946 and 2008. This project is in its initial stages, but will become a major focus in 2015-2016.
Published Paper
2023. “When TED Talks, Does Anyone Listen? A New Data Set on Political Leadership.” Review of International Organizations. 18: 169–199 (with Gabriella Lloyd and Irfan Nooruddin).
Abstract: The Technocratic and Education Dataset (TED) provides comprehensive new data on the educational and professional backgrounds of the heads of government of all sovereign states between 1946 and 2015. TED details the educational and employment credentials of 1733 unique heads of government, and provides additional information on their demographic backgrounds and military experience. TED comes in leader-level and country-year versions. These data make three major contributions to the study of leadership. First, TED offers a longer time series than most extant data sets on leadership. Second, TED offers data on a broader cross section of countries, facilitating scholarship on a wider variety of countries, including non-OECD ones, which are excluded from many existing datasets on leaders. Third, by offering detailed data on the educational and employment experiences of leaders, TED helps scholars interested in the mechanisms underlying the effects of these experiences generate more rigorous tests of their theories. TED, therefore, represents a major step forward for those interested in leadership. In this article, we introduce TED and use it to show how the pool of international leaders has changed over time. We end with an empirical application of the data in which we use leadership characteristics to predict countries’ sovereign credit ratings. The article concludes with a discussion of other potential applications of these new data.
Published Paper
2023. “When TED Talks, Does Anyone Listen? A New Data Set on Political Leadership.” Review of International Organizations. 18: 169–199 (with Gabriella Lloyd and Irfan Nooruddin).
Abstract: The Technocratic and Education Dataset (TED) provides comprehensive new data on the educational and professional backgrounds of the heads of government of all sovereign states between 1946 and 2015. TED details the educational and employment credentials of 1733 unique heads of government, and provides additional information on their demographic backgrounds and military experience. TED comes in leader-level and country-year versions. These data make three major contributions to the study of leadership. First, TED offers a longer time series than most extant data sets on leadership. Second, TED offers data on a broader cross section of countries, facilitating scholarship on a wider variety of countries, including non-OECD ones, which are excluded from many existing datasets on leaders. Third, by offering detailed data on the educational and employment experiences of leaders, TED helps scholars interested in the mechanisms underlying the effects of these experiences generate more rigorous tests of their theories. TED, therefore, represents a major step forward for those interested in leadership. In this article, we introduce TED and use it to show how the pool of international leaders has changed over time. We end with an empirical application of the data in which we use leadership characteristics to predict countries’ sovereign credit ratings. The article concludes with a discussion of other potential applications of these new data.
