San Jose de Apartado, Antioquia, Colombia
My research focuses on several themes that lie at the intersection of peace studies and comparative politics: comparative democratization, elections, civil conflict, and international development. My research has often relied on cross-national statistical work, but has also involved continuing fieldwork in Colombia and, most recently, experimental research. In practice, these interests have translated into three major projects, which I describe below. First, my book, Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century, studies the success (and failure) of elections in promoting democracy in the developing world. that article grew out of a series of articles on elections and democratization in post-conflict countries. Second, I study the political economy of economic exclusion, particularly in Colombia. Finally, I study the origins and consequences of technocratic leadership in world politics.
The Political Economy of Elections and Democratization
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the Western-led international community has encouraged developing countries to hold elections as a visible manifestation of their democratic commitments. The result has been an electoral surge in every corner of the globe. Yet the success of the electoral project is open to question, as elections have at times incited social instability and failed to promote democracy. This project, co-investigated with Irfan Nooruddin asks why.
Book: Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century (2016, Cambridge University Press)
Why are “free and fair” elections so often followed by democratic backsliding? Elections in Hard Times answers this critical question, showing why even clean elections fail to advance democracy when held amidst challenging structural conditions. The book opens with a comprehensive, accessible synthesis of fifty years of research on elections and democratization, a boon for experts, policymakers, and students. It then develops a new theory of why elections fail in countries with little democratic history or fiscal resources, and a history of violent conflict. In a series of five empirical chapters, the book leverages an eclectic mix of cross-national data, short case studies, and surveys of voters to support this theory. Elections in Hard Times closes with a careful examination of popular strategies of democracy promotion, evaluating steps designed to support elections. This book will attract academic experts on democratization and elections, students, and policymakers.
Articles
Before writing a book, we published three articles on the political economy of democratization, elections, aid, and post-conflict recovery:
2012. "The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Politics 74(2): 558-570.
Abstract: Elections are the centerpiece of efforts to rehabilitate countries devastated by civil conflict, and they are held increasingly often and early. We argue that the inability of postconflict politicians to commit credibly to respect peace and democracy implies that elections will inflame tensions unless countries have previous democratic experience or elections are delayed to allow for institution building. We test this theoretical framework with a
statistical model of economic recovery and conflict recurrence. We show that early elections, particularly in new democracies, hasten recurrence; delaying elections two years in new democracies or one year in more established democracies can help forestall renewed violence.
2009. "Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Review of International Organizations 4(1): 1--27 (lead article).
Abstract: Does World Bank aid to countries damaged by civil conflict meet its stated goals of speeding economic recovery and reducing the risk of conflict recidivism? We contend that the Bank’s success depends on its ability to bolster and signal the credibility of politicians’ commitments to peaceful politics and tailor its programs to the post-conflict environment. In the first systematic evaluation of World Bank post-conflict assistance, we estimate selection-corrected event history models of the effect of Bank programs on recovery and recurrence using an original dataset of all World Bank programs in post-conflict environments. Among key results, we find that the Bank tends to select aid recipients according to their pre-existing probability of conflict recurrence and that, once we control for this non-random selection, the Bank has no systematic effect on either conflict recurrence or economic recovery.
2009. "Democracy Under the Gun: Understanding Post-Conflict Economic Recovery" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(3): 3--29 (lead article).
Abstract: Increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics. But why do some countries' economies recover more quickly than others'? The authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery. In turn, the ability of political actors to eschew further violence credibly depends on postconflict political institutions. The authors test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results. First, they find that postconflict democratization retards recovery. Second, outright military victory sets the stage for a longer peace than negotiated settlements do. This research deepens the understanding of the bases of economic recovery and conflict recidivism in postconflict countries and points to future research that can augment this knowledge further still.
Book: Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century (2016, Cambridge University Press)
Why are “free and fair” elections so often followed by democratic backsliding? Elections in Hard Times answers this critical question, showing why even clean elections fail to advance democracy when held amidst challenging structural conditions. The book opens with a comprehensive, accessible synthesis of fifty years of research on elections and democratization, a boon for experts, policymakers, and students. It then develops a new theory of why elections fail in countries with little democratic history or fiscal resources, and a history of violent conflict. In a series of five empirical chapters, the book leverages an eclectic mix of cross-national data, short case studies, and surveys of voters to support this theory. Elections in Hard Times closes with a careful examination of popular strategies of democracy promotion, evaluating steps designed to support elections. This book will attract academic experts on democratization and elections, students, and policymakers.
Articles
Before writing a book, we published three articles on the political economy of democratization, elections, aid, and post-conflict recovery:
2012. "The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Politics 74(2): 558-570.
Abstract: Elections are the centerpiece of efforts to rehabilitate countries devastated by civil conflict, and they are held increasingly often and early. We argue that the inability of postconflict politicians to commit credibly to respect peace and democracy implies that elections will inflame tensions unless countries have previous democratic experience or elections are delayed to allow for institution building. We test this theoretical framework with a
statistical model of economic recovery and conflict recurrence. We show that early elections, particularly in new democracies, hasten recurrence; delaying elections two years in new democracies or one year in more established democracies can help forestall renewed violence.
2009. "Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Review of International Organizations 4(1): 1--27 (lead article).
Abstract: Does World Bank aid to countries damaged by civil conflict meet its stated goals of speeding economic recovery and reducing the risk of conflict recidivism? We contend that the Bank’s success depends on its ability to bolster and signal the credibility of politicians’ commitments to peaceful politics and tailor its programs to the post-conflict environment. In the first systematic evaluation of World Bank post-conflict assistance, we estimate selection-corrected event history models of the effect of Bank programs on recovery and recurrence using an original dataset of all World Bank programs in post-conflict environments. Among key results, we find that the Bank tends to select aid recipients according to their pre-existing probability of conflict recurrence and that, once we control for this non-random selection, the Bank has no systematic effect on either conflict recurrence or economic recovery.
2009. "Democracy Under the Gun: Understanding Post-Conflict Economic Recovery" (with Irfan Nooruddin). Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(3): 3--29 (lead article).
Abstract: Increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics. But why do some countries' economies recover more quickly than others'? The authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery. In turn, the ability of political actors to eschew further violence credibly depends on postconflict political institutions. The authors test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results. First, they find that postconflict democratization retards recovery. Second, outright military victory sets the stage for a longer peace than negotiated settlements do. This research deepens the understanding of the bases of economic recovery and conflict recidivism in postconflict countries and points to future research that can augment this knowledge further still.
Economic Exclusion and Conflict
Economists have long advanced the proposition that the protection of private property rights underpins economic performance. It is, in fact, far more important that rules do so than that they respect political rights. In this vein, economists agree with Sam Huntington, who wrote that, "The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government." In contrast, I argue that how rulers exclude particular groups from property rights protections while vigorously guarding others' shapes economic growth and inequality. To paraphrase Samuel Huntington, I argue that the most important political economic distinction among countries concerns not their degree of their government, but their distribution of government. This work originated in my dissertation, which I defended in 2008, but includes a new article on land reform in conflict in Colombia. As I complete the book manuscript described above, this project will become a major focus.
Dissertation: The Political Economy of Property Rights Discrimination
In my dissertation, I used a blend of statistical methods and a careful case study of land reform in Colombia to show how the distribution of property rights protections varies across countries and how that variation affects economic performance. I'm working now to turn the dissertation into a series of articles. Stay tuned.
Articles
2014. "Vertical Inequality, Land Reform, and Insurgency in Colombia." Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy 20(1): 5-31.
Abstract: How can we understand the origins and resilience of Colombia’s long-running insurgency? A leading theory emphasizes the feasibility of insurgency, identifying drug trafficking as the main culprit. I propose an alternative theory of civil violence that emphasizes how bargaining over property rights in the face of deep vertical inequality deepens the subordinate group’s social identity, heightens its sense of grievance, and facilitates collective violence. An examination of the history of land reform struggles in Colombia echoes this pattern. Struggles over land reforms in the 1920s and 1930s created new patterns of collective action that helped sustain campesino groups in the “independent republics” of the 1950s and 1960s and the creation of the FARC in 1964. This analysis suggests that the Colombian state’s lack of credibility on issues of land reform demands a significant third-party enforcement of any peace agreement and confidence-building measures between the FARC and the Colombian government.
Dissertation: The Political Economy of Property Rights Discrimination
In my dissertation, I used a blend of statistical methods and a careful case study of land reform in Colombia to show how the distribution of property rights protections varies across countries and how that variation affects economic performance. I'm working now to turn the dissertation into a series of articles. Stay tuned.
Articles
2014. "Vertical Inequality, Land Reform, and Insurgency in Colombia." Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy 20(1): 5-31.
Abstract: How can we understand the origins and resilience of Colombia’s long-running insurgency? A leading theory emphasizes the feasibility of insurgency, identifying drug trafficking as the main culprit. I propose an alternative theory of civil violence that emphasizes how bargaining over property rights in the face of deep vertical inequality deepens the subordinate group’s social identity, heightens its sense of grievance, and facilitates collective violence. An examination of the history of land reform struggles in Colombia echoes this pattern. Struggles over land reforms in the 1920s and 1930s created new patterns of collective action that helped sustain campesino groups in the “independent republics” of the 1950s and 1960s and the creation of the FARC in 1964. This analysis suggests that the Colombian state’s lack of credibility on issues of land reform demands a significant third-party enforcement of any peace agreement and confidence-building measures between the FARC and the Colombian government.
The Political Economy of Technocratic Expertise
Most work in political economy, mine included, is institutionalist in its framework. In other words, we political economists tend to concern ourselves with understanding how different institutions create different incentives for politicians, workers, and capitalists, creating different economic outcomes. In this project, co-investigated with Irfan Nooruddin and Gabriella Lloyd, we make a very different claim -- namely, that the educational background of world leaders matters for how they govern. In particular, we're interested in how technocrats -- those with expertise in finance and economics, particularly from prestigious Western universities -- govern differently. This has involved the creation of a new dataset on the professional background of every had of government between 1946 and 2008. This project is in its initial stages, but will become a major focus in 2015-2016.
Working Paper
2015. "The Technocratic Advantage: Does Technocratic Leadership Attract International Financing?'' (with Gabriella Lloyd and Irfan Nooruddin)
Abstract: Following recent research on the `democratic advantage', we agree that credit rating agencies will seize on heuristics, such as the presence of democratic political institutions and constraints on the executive to when assessing countries' likelihood of default and risk to potential lenders. To these two well-established heuristics, we add a third: the technocratic credentials of democratic leaders. We contend that democracies led by politicians with technocratic backgrounds are regarded more favorably by credit rating agencies and thus are more likely to receive higher sovereign ratings. Technocrats can claim wiser economic stewardship, greater ideological commitment to liberal economic principles, and deeper connections with transnational financial networks. The technocratic advantage plays an especially important role for unstable countries. We collect new data on 1,450 heads of government in 201 countries between 1946 and 2008 and show that, although access to technocratic credentials is relatively rare, leaders have become more technocratic over time. We find support for our argument that democracies led by technocrats receive higher sovereign debt ratings across multiple conceptions of technocracy. We conclude that the technocratic advantage is an important mechanism underlying the democratic advantage in sovereign debt ratings.
Working Paper
2015. "The Technocratic Advantage: Does Technocratic Leadership Attract International Financing?'' (with Gabriella Lloyd and Irfan Nooruddin)
Abstract: Following recent research on the `democratic advantage', we agree that credit rating agencies will seize on heuristics, such as the presence of democratic political institutions and constraints on the executive to when assessing countries' likelihood of default and risk to potential lenders. To these two well-established heuristics, we add a third: the technocratic credentials of democratic leaders. We contend that democracies led by politicians with technocratic backgrounds are regarded more favorably by credit rating agencies and thus are more likely to receive higher sovereign ratings. Technocrats can claim wiser economic stewardship, greater ideological commitment to liberal economic principles, and deeper connections with transnational financial networks. The technocratic advantage plays an especially important role for unstable countries. We collect new data on 1,450 heads of government in 201 countries between 1946 and 2008 and show that, although access to technocratic credentials is relatively rare, leaders have become more technocratic over time. We find support for our argument that democracies led by technocrats receive higher sovereign debt ratings across multiple conceptions of technocracy. We conclude that the technocratic advantage is an important mechanism underlying the democratic advantage in sovereign debt ratings.
The Psychology of Hope During Intractable Conflict
In a new publication with Oded Adomi Leshem and Yechiel Klar, I explore the social psychology of hope during intractable conflict in Israel. In the near future, I hope to extend this research to Colombia.
Article
Forthcoming. "Instilling Hope for Peace During Intractable Conflicts'" (with Adomi Leshem and Yechiel Klar). Social Psychological and Personality Science.
Abstract: A set of studies explored the possibility to instill hope for peace in the context of intractable conflicts. The first study examined Jewish-Israelis’ hopes for peace following a message from an out-group communicator. Results show that participants’ hopes increased after viewing a Palestinian conclude that the conflict was solvable. This held true regardless of whether the Palestinian communicator identified as a militant or a peace activist. However, Jewish-Israelis’ hopes for peace were not altered when an article, ostensibly written by conflict experts, concluded that the Palestinian–Israeli conflict was resolvable. In order to explore whether these trends are unique to group-members involved in intergroup conflict, we replicated the study on uninvolved third- party participants. The article offers a comparison of belief malleability between those who experience conflict first hand and those who observe it from afar and presents strategies that may instill hope for peace in group-members immersed in protracted violent conflicts.
Article
Forthcoming. "Instilling Hope for Peace During Intractable Conflicts'" (with Adomi Leshem and Yechiel Klar). Social Psychological and Personality Science.
Abstract: A set of studies explored the possibility to instill hope for peace in the context of intractable conflicts. The first study examined Jewish-Israelis’ hopes for peace following a message from an out-group communicator. Results show that participants’ hopes increased after viewing a Palestinian conclude that the conflict was solvable. This held true regardless of whether the Palestinian communicator identified as a militant or a peace activist. However, Jewish-Israelis’ hopes for peace were not altered when an article, ostensibly written by conflict experts, concluded that the Palestinian–Israeli conflict was resolvable. In order to explore whether these trends are unique to group-members involved in intergroup conflict, we replicated the study on uninvolved third- party participants. The article offers a comparison of belief malleability between those who experience conflict first hand and those who observe it from afar and presents strategies that may instill hope for peace in group-members immersed in protracted violent conflicts.
